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Inculpatory Declarations Against Penal Interest
and the Coconspirator Rule Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)1 includes both an exception to
the hearsay rule2 for declarations against penal interest3 and a rule for
the treatment of certain coconspirator statements as nonhearsay." Con-
' FED. R. EviD. will be referred to as FRE throughout the text of this note.
2 Hearsay is conventionally defined as an out of court assertion that is offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EvID. 801(c); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exception
to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements,
63 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 1, 3 (1972); see 5 J. WIGMORE. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1361 (rev. ed. J.
Chadbourn 1974). The hearsay rule is difficult to define, even for those well versed in the
exceptions to the rule. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE 800101], at 800-8 to -9
(1979). A layman might define hearsay as "a statement by an individual which he or she
heard someone say." Note, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 198, 200 n.14 (1978). This definition must be
qualified because a statement does not become hearsay unless it is also submitted for the
truth of the matter asserted. Id.
In the development of Anglo-American law many reasons have been articulated for ex-
cluding hearsay. Note, 79 DICK. L. REV. 189, 190 (1974). Hearsay statements are viewed as
being unreliable because the out of court declarant making the assertions was not under
oath, the demeanor of the declarant cannot be observed by the trier of fact and the
declarant is not subjected to cross-examination. C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 246; see Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 218
(1948). Of these factors, the lack of cross-examination is the biggest concern. According to
Wigmore, cross-examination is the greatest legal engine for discovering truth. 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra, § 1367. But see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, 800101, at 800-10.
Chief Justice Marshall, in Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813), maintained that
hearsay is a vehicle for fraud, intrinsically weak and incompetent to satisfy the mind that
the fact exists, id. at 296, and Wigmore viewed hearsay as a source of untrustworthiness
and error, 5 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 1362.
In order to facilitate the proof of material facts at trial, however, many exceptions to
the general rule of inadmissibility of hearsay have developed. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra, 800[01], at 800-11. Wigmore rationalized the exceptions as an attempt to accom-
modate the reliability, 5 J. WIGMORE. supra, § 1397, and necessity, id. § 1422, of particular
evidence. In addition, Maguire presented a third interest-that of adversary practice. J.
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 140-44 (1947). A more cynical view is that the hearsay exceptions exist
"to enhance social acceptance [of the judicial system] by shielding the system from possible
embarrassment." Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1786, 1809 (1980).
FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(3) makes admissible:
A statement which ... at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject
[the declarant] to... criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A state-
ment tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to ex-
culpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) provides: "[A] statement is not hearsay if ... (2) [t]he statement is
offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." This rule covers not only conspirators, but
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gress did not anticipate the inherent conflict arising from their incor-
poration into the FRE.' Indeed, at least one court has described the ad-
mission of inculpatory declarations under the declaration against penal
interest exception as a mechanism to bypass the requirements of the
coconspirator rule in those situations where the rules overlap.' Suppose,
for example, that A tells B, "C and I robbed the bank." C is on trial for
the robbery. A refuses to testify because his testimony would be self-
incriminating. The prosecution calls B as a witness to prove that C
robbed the bank. Since A and C are coconspirators, A's statement
should have to meet the pendency, furtherance and independent evi-
dence requirements of the coconspirator rule.7 The statement does not
meet these requirements,8 and, therefore, should not be admissible.
Some courts9 have argued that the statement is admissible under the
declarations against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule"0
because B is testifying to a hearsay statement which tends to suggest
also encompasses joint venturers. "[I]t is this committee's understanding that the rule is
meant to carry forward the universally accepted doctrine that a joint venturer is con-
sidered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this rule even though no conspiracy has been
charged." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7073. Therefore, the term coconspirator as used in this note is not a strict
usage.
The coconspirator rule is principally used by the state in criminal prosecutions. 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-166; Kessler, The Treatment
of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations: Putting the Conspiracy Back into
the Coconspirator Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 81 (1976); Oakley, From Hearsay to Eternity:
Pendency and the Co-conspirator Exception in California-Fact, Fiction and a Novel Ap-
proach, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 11 (1975); Note, California Admits Declarations Against
Penal Interest Regardless of Unavailability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 322, 324 (1965); Comment,
The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 530, 531
(1958); Comment, Reconstructing the Independent Evidence Requirement of the Cocon-
spirator Hearsay Exception, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1439 (1979).
Professor Rothstein pointed out that if a jointly incriminating statement were inad-
missible as the Subcommittee proposed, the language should be changed to say "is not in-
cluded within this exception." Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 n.150 (1974) (statement of Paul F. Roth-
stein). The Subcommittee's proposed amendment provided that a jointly incriminating
statement "is not admissible." Professor Rothstein, however, said that this was inadequately
worded because the amendment "would exclude the statements even if they are within
another exception to the hearsay rule or are not hearsay at all." Id. This is as close as Con-
gress came to recognizing the conflict between the coconspirator rule and the declaration
against penal interest exception.
6 See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(E). For text of rule, see note 4 supra. Some coconspirator state-
ments may be admitted as acts. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). This is not a new phenomenon; it is
the use of a declaration against penal interest exception that is new. See note 120 infra.
' On the basis of the facts given, none of the coconspirator requirements have been met.
There is no independent evidence of the conspiracy. The conspiracy, if there was one, is
over, and the statement did not advance the objects of the conspiracy.
See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
'0 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). For a definition and discussion of the legislative history of
declarations against penal interest, see notes 18-20 & accompanying text infra.
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the personal participation of the declarant (A) in the crime and, hence,
subject him to criminal liability."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the incongruity of ad-
mitting inculpatory declarations made by coconspirators under two dif-
ferent rules in United States v. Alvarez, 2 and held that the conflict
would be eliminated if the admissibility of inculpatory declarations
against penal interest were conditioned on establishing corroborating
circumstances that indicate trustworthiness."3 This note will demon-
strate that requiring corroborating circumstances for the admission of
inculpatory declarations against penal interest does not reconcile the
two rules. Instead, the appropriate way to interpret the two rules is to
recognize: First, as a factual matter, the portion of a coconspirator's
declaration which implicates the accused is almost never against the
declarant's interest, and, therefore, should not be admitted under the
declaration against penal interest exception; and second, even in the few
cases where the portion of the statement implicating the accused is
against the declarant's interest, the statement still should not be admitted
under the declaration against penal interest exception because Con-
gress intended to limit the admission of statements made by coconspira-
tors to only those which meet the pendency, furtherance and indepen-
dent evidence requirements of the coconspirator rule.
THE DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST EXCEPTION
The FRE includes declarations against penal interest as an exception
to the hearsay rule." Rule 804(b)(3) permits the admission of hearsay if
the declarant is unavailable, 5 his declaration was against interest when
made "'6 and his declaration so far tended to subject him to penal liability
that a reasonable person would not have made the declaration unless it
were true. 7 In addition, the rule requires a showing of corroborating cir-
cumstances that indicate the statement is trustworthy before an ex-
culpatory declaration may be admitted. 8
1 See United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v.
Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976)).
12 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
13 Id
" It is the modern trend to include declarations against penal interest as a hearsay ex-
ception. See note 120 infra.
1 FED. R. Evm. 804(b). The declarant is considered unavailable when a privilege against
testifying is asserted, for instance, the fifth amendment, as in the introductory example. I&
804(a)(1).
1 Id 804(b)(3). For text of rule, see note 3 supra.
" FED. R. EvmD. 804(b)(3).
Id. Exculpatory declarations against penal interest are declarations against the
declarant's interest which exonerate the defendant.
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This rule does not expressly refer to inculpatory declarations against
penal interest, that is, declarations against the penal interest of the
declarant which also implicate the accused. 9 However, it appears that
Congress intended that inculpatory declarations against penal interest
be admissible in certain circumstances.' Congress apparently left the
" Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against
Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1189, 1198 (1978).
Earlier drafts of FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(3) (at that time the rule was numbered 804(b)(4)) con-
tained a provision excluding inculpatory statements from the coverage of the exception.
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(4) (1971 draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 438-39 (1971); Pro-
posed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-04(b)(4) (1969 draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969). This provi-
sion was absent from the official Advisory Committee draft. The Advisory Committee's
note in the official draft explained:
Ordinarily the third-party confession is though [sic] of in terms of exculpating
the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may in-
clude statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declara-
tions against interest they would be admissible as related statements. Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 .... and Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818 ....
both involved confessions by codefendants which implicated the accused ....
Whether the confession might have been admissible as a declaration against
penal interest was not considered or discussed.... These decisions, however,
by no means require that all statements implicating another person be ex-
cluded from the category of declarations against interest. Whether a state-
ment is in fact against interest must be determined from the circumstances of
each case.
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(4), Advisory Committee Note (1972 draft), 56
F.R.D. 183, 327-28 (1972). It is clear from this note that the Advisory Committee intended
some inculpatory declarations against interest to be admissible. However, the House in-
serted a sentence making an inculpatory statement or confession offered against the accused
in a criminal case inadmissible. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7090. The justification for this addition was set
out in the Subcommittee Note: "The Subcommittee also determined to add to the Rule the
final sentence from the 1971 draft, designed to codify the [confrontation clause] doctrine of
Bruton v. United States .... Proposed Rules of Evidence: Supplement to Hearings on
H.R. 5463 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1973) (citation omitted). The House's version was sent to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. This Committee decided to delete the House's provision on
the inadmissibility of inculpatory statements offered against the accused for two reasons.
First, "the basic approach of the rules is to avoid codifying, or attempting to codify, con-
stitutional evidentiary principles, such as the fifth amendment's right against self-
incrimination and, here, the sixth amendment's right of confrontation. Codification of a con-
stitutional principle is unnecessary and, where the principle is under development, often
unwise." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7068. Second, "the House provision does not appear to recognize the exceptions
to the Bruton rule ...." Id The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version,
writing: "[t]he Conferees agree to delete the provision regarding statements by a codefen-
dant, thereby reflecting the general approach in the Rules of Evidence to avoid attempting
to codify constitutional evidentiary principles." H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098,7106. "[T]hus Rule 804(b)(3), as passed by
Congress, leaves the admissibility of a declaration against interest which inculpates an ac-,
cused subject to the Supreme Court's development of the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause in this context." 11 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 804.06(3)[2], at VIH-283-84. Ac-
cording to McCormick, the provision on inculpatory statements
was removed from the draft submitted by the Advisory Committee to, and
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determination of these circumstances to the courts.2'
THE COCONSPIRATOR RULE
Conversely, Congress carved out specific requirements for the ad-
missibility of coconspirators' statements.2 Traditionally, to be admissi-
ble, a coconspirator's statement must have been made during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and there must have been indepen-
dent evidence establishing the existence of the conspiracy.' Congress
adopted by, the Supreme Court, on the theory that, while third party
statements implicating the accused made by a declarant in custody or to a per-
son in authority might well be motivated by a desire to curry favor, the same
was not necessarily so with regard to all third-party implicating statements,
and hence that the matter could not appropriately be covered by general rule
but must depend on circumstances.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2,'§ 276 n.1 (Supp. 1978).
Judge Weinstein takes the opposite view and explains that the final sentence excluding
inculpatory statements was deleted because it was not needed, and therefore, that rure
should be read to exclude inculpatory statements. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-110. However, the district court in United States v. Turner, 475 F.
Supp. 194, 197 (E.D. Mich. 1978), pointed out: "It is unclear as to whether Weinstein's
reading of the history of the Rule ... has been adopted by any Court."
Regardless of legislative intent, the inculpatory version of rule 804(b)(3) is recognized by
some federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McClendon, 454 F. Supp.
960 (W.D. Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952 (1979). Other states have decided that the
House version is better and, therefore, do not admit statements implicating the declarant
and the defendant as declarations against penal interest under their evidence codes. See,
e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE R. OF Evm. § 804(b)(3) (Supp. 1979). This note suggests a resolution of
the tension between the declaration against penal interest exception and the coconspirator
rule for those jurisdictions which include inculpatory declarations in the declaration against
interest exception.
I See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 700 (5th Cir. 1978); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7068. It is not
entirely clear that the legislature has the authority to delegate this power to the courts.
See generally S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1975). The FRE can be amended in only two ways. See FED. R. EvID. 1102. First, the
Supreme Court of the United States can prescribe amendments, which must then be
reported to Congress and become law 180 days after they have been reported unless Con-
gress disapproves them, 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976); and second, the rules can be amended by
an act of Congress. Id. The delegation of power question is beyond the scope of this note.
For a discussion of this issue, see W. BONDY, SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN
HISTORY IN THEORY AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS (1967); L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION
BETWEEN FRIENDS 22-23 (1978).
" FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). For text of rule, see note 4 supra.
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 461 (2d ed. 1977).
Several theories have been offered in support of the coconspirator rule. Levie, Hearsay and
Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1954). The most common theory is based on agency principles.
Under this theory coconspirators are each other's agents, and hence are liable for each
other's acts. Id. However, as prosecutors began to use this rule extensively, the rule
became strained to such an extent that the agency rationale became totally out of line withi
the actual practice. Id. For discussions of the various rationales offered to explain the!
coconspirator rule, see M. SEIDMAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN INDIANA 118 n.14 (1977) (the
1980]
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enacted this traditional coconspirator rule to limit the types of admissi-
ble coconspirator statements. 24
The pendency limitation, which requires that the statement be made
during the course of the conspiracy, exists because a declaration made
after the conspiracy ends is particularly untrustworthy.2 As one court
noted, it is not unusual when thieves fall out for one to fasten guilt on
the other while keeping his own skirts as clean as possible.8
The furtherance requirement is a product of agency rationale.' At
one point, the retention of this limitation was doubtful.' Although the
Advisory Committee considering the rule recognized that the "agency.
theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction,"' it saw the furtherance re-*
quirement as a useful way to protect defendants."
Although both the pendency and furtherance requirements are ex-
pressly listed under FRE 801(d)(2)(E), the rule does not expressly men-
adversary system); darland & Snow, supra note 2, at 5 (necessity and reliability); Kessler,
supra note 4, at 78 (agency); Oakley, supra note 4, at 17-23 (substantive policy and assump-
tion of risk); Note, Co-Conspirator Declarations: Procedure and Standard of Proof for Ad-
mission Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 577, 578 (1979) (neces-
sity); Comment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 530, 536 (1958) (ratification).
I Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-01(c)(3}(v), Advisory Committee Note (1969
draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 341 (1969). A possible interpretation of the Advisory Committee's note
is that the rule could expand so long as something other than the agency basis were used.
However, in light of their intent to adopt the accepted pattern and to be consistent with the
Supreme Court rule, this is not a persuasive construction. Id.
= Levie, supra note 23, at 1173.
People v. Coble, 65 Cal. App. 3d 187, 191, 135 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1976).
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1387 (1972); Comment, The
Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The Limits of Its Logic, 37 LA. L. REv. 1101,
1113 (1977).
1 Senator McClellan suggested that the requirement of furtherance be abolished and
replaced by "(1) a requirement of the presence of an independent circumstantial guarantee
of trustworthiness, and (2) a requirement of relevancy to the character or the execution of
the conspiracy itself." Proposed Rules of Evidence: Supplement to Hearings on H.R. 5463
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 56 (1973) (letter of Sen. McClellan). McClellan did not think that furtherance
guaranteed reliable statements. See id. The Advisory Committee decided not to follow
Senator McClellan's suggestions.
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-01(c)(3)(v), Advisory Committee Note (1969
draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 341 (1969).
1 Id.; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-170.
The furtherance requirement was abolished by both the UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
63(9) and the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 508(b). These codes say that if the statement is
relevant it is admissible. Since FED. R. Evm. 402 is the general provision in the FRE for
relevant statements, and since the FRE did not abolish the furtherance requirement, it is
clear that the drafters wanted a stringent furtherance requirement. United States v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1978); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(E)[O1], at
801-172. Some courts do npt follow the congressional mandate and construe the requirement
broadly. See, e.g., United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 855 (1975); United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 932 (1971).
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tion independent evidence as a requirement for the admission of
coconspirator statements. Nevertheless, most courts interpret FRE
104w1 as furnishing the basis for an independent evidence requirement
and read such a requirement into the rule.2 In retaining the pendency,
furtherance and independent evidence requirements, Congress envi-
sioned no further expansion of the traditional coconspirator rule." The
United States Supreme Court3 and many commentators have expressed
concern about the expansion of the coconspirator rule and have recom-
mended that the rule be strictly contained to insure the protection of
defendants' rights.-
This concern with protecting defendants' rights conflicts with the
desire to protect society." While the defendant needs protection against
admission of unreliable statements, 7 the admission of coconspirator
statements helps combat the greater societal danger posed by group
criminal activity compared to individual crime.' Group participation in-
creases the chance of success and the extent of harm, and lessens the
likelihood of abandonment of criminal activity. 9 Furthermore, con-
spiracy is difficult to prove," and the difficulty is increased because
s' FED. R. Evm. 104 provides:
(a) Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
(b) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
Bergman, The Coconspirators' Exception: Defining the Standard of the Independent
Evidence Test Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 105 (1976).
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the Supreme Court required independent
evidence to prevent bootstrapping. But see United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978) (new rules of evidence overruled Glasser). In
Martorano, the court did, however, find significant independent evidence.
I Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-01(c)(3)(v), Advisory Committee Note (1969
draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 341 (1969).
4 See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949).
" See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 27, at 1384; Levie, supra note 23, at 1170; Oakley,
supra note 4, at 23; Comment, supra note 27, at 1119.
4 Levie, supra note 23, at 1167.
37 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-173.
" Garland & Snow, supra note 2, at 2; Oakley, supra note 4, at 11; Comment, supra note
27, at 1108; Comment, supra note 23, at 533; Note, Connecting Defendants to Conspiracies:
The Slight Evidence Rule and the Federal Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 881, 883 (1978).
" Garland & Snow, supra note 2, at 2; Oakley, supra note 4, at 11; Comment, supra note
27, at 1108; Comment, supra note 23, at 533; Note, supra note 38, at 883.
0 Levie, supra note 23, at 1166; Sessions & Hall, The Coconspirator's Statement:
Evaluating Preliminary Questions of Admissibility Under Rule 801{d)t2)(E), 11 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 83, 84 (1979).
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members of the conspiracy can invoke their fifth amendment privilege
to refuse to testify.41
Protection of society thus necessitates some method for admitting
coconspirator statements. Since coconspirator statements are not in-
herently reliable," requirements for their admission must protect defen-
dants from the idle chatter of criminal partners and from misreported
or fabricated evidence. 3 The requirements of pendency, furtherance and
independent evidence strike a proper balance between defendants'
rights and societal protection. 4 Protection of defendants' rights would
be eroded if conspirators' statements which do not satisfy the stringent
requirements of the coconspirator rule are admitted under the lesser
standard of the declaration against penal interest exception.
THE CONFLICT
The conflict between the rules may be illustrated by the situation
where A tells B that he and C committed a crime. 5 Admitting A's state-
ment under the declaration against penal interest exception and not
under the coconspirator rule initially appears to pose no major eviden-
tiary problem. Many hearsay exceptions overlap,'6 and a declaration fall-
ing within one exception is not inadmissible because it does not meet
the requirements of another exception.47 If one adheres to the United
States v. Alvarez 8 rationale, the coconspirator rule and the hearsay ex-
"1 S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN. supra note 23, at 462 (quoting R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 378 (1977)).
Comment, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 622, 623 (1975). Davenport suggests that the coconspira-
tor rule be abolished and the declaration against interest exception be used in lieu of it.
Davenport, supra note 27, at 1396. However, he still does not think inculpatory declarations
against penal interest should be admitted because there is little assurance of reliability. Id.
" S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 23, at 462 (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(E)[01]).
" See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 23, at 462.
"4 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
" Although the coconspirator rule is not a hearsay exception, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E),
the analysis does not change. "The fact that the new Federal Rules choose the redefinition
approach, rather than the approach of creating exceptions is of no great moment." S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 23, at 460. "The distinction between a statement which
is not hearsay and a statement which is an exception to the hearsay rule is semantic,"
United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978), with the difference that
there are no residual exceptions for admissions, but there are residual exceptions for hear-
say. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). These residual exceptions were included to permit some
flexibility for the courts to develop new hearsay exceptions. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN,
supra note 23, at 538.
"7 Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest. An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
HARV. L. REV. 1, 65 (1944). For example, hearsay exceptions would overlap in the case of an
authentic business record over 20 years old. The record could be admitted under the
business record exception, FED. R. EvID. 803(6), or the exception for ancient documents, id
803(16).
, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ception for inculpatory declarations against penal interest would almost
completely overlap, and the coconspirator rule's requirements would
rarely have to be met.49
Some recent decisions, including Alvarez, maintain that almost any
statement a declarant coconspirator could make to incriminate the ac-
cused coconspirator would also tend to incriminate himself.0 These
courts reason that the statement is against the declarant's interest
because the statement tends to show the declarant had insider's
knowledge and implies his personal participation in the crime. 1 In addi-
tion, the declarant coconspirator is not only liable for the crime of con-
spiracy, but is also vicariously liable for the specified offenses commited
in furtherance of the conspiracy even if he did not directly participate in
the commission of the offenses.2 Hence, the declarant coconspirator's
statement inculpating the accused coconspirator would be against the
declarant's penal interest.' If this reasoning is followed and coconspira-
tor statements are admitted under the inculpatory declarations against
penal interest exception, the limitations of the coconspirator rule are
negated without alternative safeguards being imposed." There is great
," Id.; United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (purpose of FED. R.
Evm. 801(d)(2)(E) would be negated if coconspirators' statements are admissible under id.
804(b3)). The Model Code of Evidence recognizes the possible conflict between the
coconspirator rule and the inculpatory declaration against penal interest exception and
allows this type of statement to be admitted under either rule. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 509, Comment b.
0 584 F.2d at 701; United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976). "All confes-
sions (and usually all declarations of co-conspirators) are against the declarant's interest."
Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. Ct. 501, 504, 69 A.2d 436, 438 (1949); see United
States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 97, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1978) (statement would have been admissible
as against penal interest if the declarant had had personal knowledge, but not admissible
under the coconspirator rule).
11 United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Thomas,
571 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976);
Commonwealth v. Keizer, - Mass. -, -, 385 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (1979).
u W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. CRIMINAL LAW § 65, at 513 (1972). "[AIll conspirators are liable
for the acts of each of the others done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Note, Evidence:
Hearsay: Admissibility of Declarations Against Penal Interest, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 638,
645 (1965).
5 United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
u Some may argue that FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) imposes additional safeguards.
Nonetheless, this argument does not withstand close scrutiny. First, there is no require-
ment of the accused's complicity in the conspiracy. United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694,
701 (5th Cir. 1978). Second, it is open to question whether the unavailability requirement
adds to the probability of reliability, see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2,
804(b)(3)[02], at 804-95; Note, Declarations Against Interest. A Critical Review of the
Unavailability Requirement, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 301, 308 (1967); Comment, Evidence: The
Unavailability Requirement of Declaration Against Interest Hearsay, 55 IowA L. REV. 477
(1969), and thereby protects the accused. Certainly, it does not afford much additional pro-
tection where the declarant coconspirator will nearly always use his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and, therefore, be unavailable under either the cocon-
spirator rule or the declaration against penal interest exception.
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danger that the reduced threshold for admitting declarations against in-
terest will be used to evaluate statements that would traditionally be
evaluated under the coconspirator rule.5 Thus, by admitting coconspira-
tor statements under the inculpatory declarations against penal interest
exception, the coconspirator rule is emasculated.'
The general rule of statutory construction requires that each provi-
sion in a statute be considered in the context of all its other provisions,57
and, if possible, that each provision be construed so that every provision
has significance." The coconspirator rule and the declaration against
Third, the personal knowledge requirement under the declaration against penal interest
exception, see FED. R. EviD. 602, is somewhat like the independent evidence requirement
under the coconspirator rule in that both are there to show the connection between the
declarant and the defendant, and to make it more probable that the defendant will be able
to expose inaccuracies. Oakley, supra note 4, at 49. The personal knowledge requirement
would not be more protective than that for independent evidence.
Fourth, the basic rationale for the against interest requirement is that an individual is
not likely to make a statement adverse to his criminal interest unless it is true. Morgan,
Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV. 451, 456-57 (1952). While this notion has
some common sense appeal, no empirical studies have so demonstrated. Comment, supra
note 20, at 1217. Furthermore, there are many instances where individuals have confessed
to crimes they did not commit, id. at 1209; see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 467 (1977), thus subjecting themselves to penal liability by making a
false statement. Until this common sense assumption is tested, the validity of the assump-
tion will remain arguable. Even assuming that this rationale is sound, the against interest
requirement is not as restrictive as the furtherance and pendency requirements which tie
the statement down to a particular time and purpose. For example, a statement which was
against interest but was made after the conspiracy terminated would not be admissible
under the coconspirator rule; rather, it would be admissible under FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
The furtherance requirement exists in order to prevent the mere inculpation of fellow
coconspirators. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra, at 379. If inculpatory coconspirator
statements are admitted under the declaration against penal interest exception, there
would be a great danger that this would occur. Congress rejected the adoption of a
trustworthiness guarantee to replace the use of the furtherance requirement, see note 28
supra, suggesting that the furtherance requirement should be strictly construed.
Fifth, in the situation where the defendant inculpates the accused, the protection gained
from requiring that the statement be against interest is absent. See notes 117-26 & accom-
panying text infra. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) adds a requirement of corroboration for ex-
culpatory declarations against penal interest. Nevertheless, it does not require corrobora-
tion for inculpatory declarations. Therefore, the safeguards offered by FED. R. Evm.
804(b)(3) are not really safeguards at all.
1 United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978). To illustrate: suppose 0
makes a statement to a third person the day after a mail fraud caper was completed. In the
statement 0 admits participating in this venture and also implicates P. This statement
would traditionally be evaluated under a coconspirator rule, and would probably be inad-
missible since the conspiracy was over. Now, as long as 0 asserted his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, some courts would allow the admission of this state-
ment as a declaration against penal interest.
" "[Tihere is a serious danger that the declaration against interest exception will
swallow the coconspirator's exception with its attendant Glasser safeguard." United States
v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
" Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1020 (1971).
", Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945); see Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105,
112-13 (1928).
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penal interest exception were expressed in a single enactment. There-
fore, unless Congress meant the two rules to be interchangeable, each
should have a separate and distinct purpose.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to attempt to
reconcile the conflict between these rules. In United States v. Alvarez, 9
the government proposed two theories for the admissibility of a deceased
coconspirator's extrajudicial statement which inculpated the defend-
ant." The government contended that the statement was admissible
either under the coconspirator rule"1 or under the declaration against
penal interest exception.2 The court ruled that the independent
evidence requirement of the coconspirator rule had not been met, and,
consequently, the deceased declarant's statement was inadmissible
under that rule. 3 Furthermore, the court held that the declaration
against penal interest exception requires corroborating circumstances
for admissibility," and, because that requirement had not been met, the
deceased declarant's statement was likewise inadmissible under that ex-
ception .
5
Although rule 804(b)(3) does not specifically refer to inculpatory
declarations against penal interest,6 6 the Alvarez court applied the
rule's express language governing requirements for the admissibility of
exculpatory declarations to inculpatory declarations against penal in-
terest as well.6 According to the court, this reformulation requiring cor-
roborating circumstances would avoid constitutional difficulties with
the confrontation clause," provide a workable unitary standard, and
solve the incongruity between the coconspirator rule and the declara-
59 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
6 In Alvarez, one alleged coconspirator told another that the defendant was his heroin
supplier. The declarant coconspirator died before the defendant went to trial. The deceased
declarant's out of court statement was the critical evidence connecting the defendant to the
conspiracy. Id. at 695-96.
61 Id. at 696.
Id at 699.
Id. at 701.
I at 702. It was stated in Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954), that "cor-
roborative evidence does not have to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even
by a preponderance, as long as there is substantial independeni evidence that the offense
has been committed." Id at 156 (emphasis added). This suggests that corroboration may be
similar to independent evidence, which may explain why the Alvarez court thought that
corroboration solved the declaration against penal interest problem.
" FED. R. EvrD. 804(b)(3). For text of rule, see note 3 supra. For a discussion of the
legislative history and development of the inference that Congress intended for inculpatory
declarations against interest to be admissible, see note 20 supra.
584 F.2d at 701.
"Id- "[Tihe Court held that the confrontation clause . . . requires corroborating cir-
cumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements." S. SALTZBURG & K.
REDDEN, supra note 23, at 234 (Supp. 1980). The necessity of the court's constitutional con-
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tion against penal interest exception as applied to inculpatory state-
ments. 9 However, the court in Alvarez did not adequately resolve the
conflict since it failed to recognize the inherent differences between ex-
culpatory and inculpatory declarations against penal interest.
Although the Alvarez solution of a uniform standard for both in-
culpatory and exculpatory declarations against penal interest might
seem desirable to facilitate the application of the standard,'7 0 several con-
siderations prevent applying a uniform rule requiring corroborating cir-
cumstances to both types of declarations. First, exculpatory declara-
tions against penal interest must be admitted under the compulsory pro-
cess clause of the sixth amendment" and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.7 1 On the other hand, the admission of in-
culpatory declarations against penal interest is not required, and may
even be precluded by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.73
frontation holding has been questioned. Id. First, the statement was probably not against
interest since it was made to someone involved in the criminal activity. Second, the court
could have deleted the reference to third parties. Id. Therefore, the court did not have to
reach the constitutional issue. For a further discussion of the confrontation clause prob-
lems, see notes 96-114 & accompanying text infra.
5 84 F.2d at 701.
7 Id.
71 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The defendant has a fundamental right
to present witnesses in his own defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); 4
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
' Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973). Professor Westen argues that the
compulsory process clause and the confrontation clause are both designed for witness pro-
duction, and the defendant's interest can only be compromised when there is an urgent
need for secrecy. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 589 (1978).
1 United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977). This, of
course, depends on the circumstances of the case. For example, many circuit courts hold
that the sixth amendment problems raised by inculpatory statements by a coconspirator
are overcome if there are interlocking confessions by defendants. See, e.g., United States v.
Walton, 538 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1976); Mack v. Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1972); Metropolis v. Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (10th Cir.
1971); United States em rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968). In Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), the Court reasoned that once a defendant's confession stands
unchallenged before the jury, the right to cross-examine or impeach his confessing codefen-
dant would be of little value to the complaining defendant. Id. at 73. Moreover, denial of
confrontation does not require automatic reversal. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 734-36
(1969).
An example of a case where the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation had
been violated is Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). An accomplice who had been
found guilty in a separate trial was called as a witness in Douglas' trial. The accomplice's
extrajudicial confession implicated Douglas. However, Douglas' accomplice refused to
testify since his own conviction was being appealed, and the prosecutor then read the ac-
complice's confession to the jury. The Supreme Court found that Douglas' inability to cross-
examine his accomplice was a violation of the confrontation clause. This clause states that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
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Another complication is that the standard of corroboration required
for admission of exculpatory declarations against penal interest has not
been uniformly decided.7 Some courts have interpreted the corrobora-
tion requirement so stringently that almost no exculpatory declarations
against penal interest are admitted and the rule thereby loses its
utility." Other courts have evaluated the credibility of the witness in-
stead of the corroborating circumstances."8 One court has employed a
more liberal standard allowing admission once a threshold of corrobora-
tion is met."
Considering the wide range of standards applied to corroborating
evidence for exculpatory statements, it is unclear which standard of cor-
roboration would be applied to inculpatory declarations against penal in-
terest.78 The few courts that have considered the admissibility of in-
culpatory declarations against penal interest have not announced any
guidelines.
Even if the same degree of corroboration is required for both' in-
culpatory and exculpatory declarations against penal interest, the
resulting protection afforded a defendant would not be the same. If a
high standard of corroboration is required for exculpatory declarations,
they will be difficult to admit, and the defendant's protection against an
unfair conviction is reduced. 0 If a defendant cannot have a third party's
confession admitted, the defendant may be convicted even though he
did not commit the crime. On the other hand, if a high standard of cor-
roboration is applied to admit inculpatory declarations against penal in-
terest, the defendant's protection is increased," because there is less
chance that the defendant will be convicted on the basis of untrust-
worthy evidence. The converse is also true. If the standard of corrobora-
tion is relaxed for exculpatory declarations against penal interest, the
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For additional discussion of the confron-
tation clause, see notes 95-110 & accompanying text infra.
"' 11 J. MOORE, supra note 20, 804.06(3)[2], at VIII-282; Comment, supra note 20, at
1204-05.
"s See Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1977).
" United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-108. Since credibility is a matter for the jury,
these courts have clearly misunderstood the corroboration requirement. Id.; see United
States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1977). In United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d
687, 692 (9th Cir. 1978), the court questioned whether a judge had the power under FED. R.
Evm. 804(b)(3) to exclude a statement due to untrustworthiness of the witness, but found it
unnecessary to answer that question.
" United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976); Comment, supra note 20, at
1206.
" Comment, supra note 20, at 1198.
" Id. at 1201; see, e.g., United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 972 (1977); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976).84 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104.
8 Id.
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defendant's protection against unfair conviction is increased; at the
same time, if a less stringent corroboration standard is applied to in-
culpatory declarations against penal interest, an innocent defendant
could be convicted on the basis of an inherently untrustworthy state-
ment." Because of this risk of convicting innocent persons, it would
seem better to require different standards for exculpatory and in-
culpatory declarations against penal interest, thereby erring in the
defendant's favor with each. Since the two types of evidence should not
be held to the same standard, the Alvarez court should have focused
less attention on a unitary standard in attempting to reconcile the rules.
In attempting to reconcile the incongruity between the coconspirator
rule and the inculpatory declaration against penal interest exception,
the Alvarez court did focus on the problem of the inherent unreliability
of inculpatory declarations against penal interest. 5 The Alvarez court
thought the incongruity would disappear if the reliability question was
addressed by making FRE 804(b)(3) available only where circumstances
of trustworthiness were established. 86
In the committee hearings on the rule, it was originally suggested
that the coconspirator rule's requirement of furtherance be abolished
and replaced with a guarantee of trustworthiness. Although Congress
chose not to adopt this suggestion,8 the Alvarez court appears to have
adopted the approach as a solution to the problem.
' Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), suggests that the standard of corrobora-
tion should not be too high. See also 11 J. MOORE, supra note 20, 804.06(3)[2], at VII-283; 4
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-106.
In Chambers, a witness had admitted committing the crime for which the defendant was
being tried. He had given a statement admitting guilt to defense counsel, but later
repudiated the statement and claimed he had an alibi. Although the defendant showed the
alibi was false, the defendant was not allowed to cross-examine the witness because of the
voucher rule, and could not call anyone who had heard this witness' admission because this
would be hearsay.
In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the
ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.... [W]e hold quite simply that
under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court
deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
410 U.S. at 300-03.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-111.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 52, at 15.
584 F.2d at 701. Accomplices are notorious for their lack of veracity, Cool v. United
States, 409 U.S. 100. 103 (1972); see Levie, supra note 23, at 1166, and their credibility is in-
evitably suspect, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d}(2)(E)[01], at 801-171; Note, supra note 38, at 890.
584 F.2d at 701.
Proposed Rules of.Evidence: Supplement to Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 56
(1973) (letter of Sen. McClellan).
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-01(c)(3)(v), Advisory Committee Note (1969
draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 341 (1969); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 2,
801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-170.
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Furthermore, the Alvarez approach allows coconspirators' statements
to be admitted under a new exception, and thereby expands the type of
admissible statements. Instead of adhering to the traditional coconspira-
tor requirements which Congress intended to preserve," such require-
ments are put aside and a new avenue for the admission of these types
of statements is created.
There is a societal need to admit coconspirator statements. How-
ever, the need is not so great as to require two avenues for their admis-
sion. Since coconspirator statements are already admissible under rule
801(d)(2)(E), there is no reason to add new requirements to the declara-
tion against penal interest exception in order to admit inculpatory co-
conspirator statements.9 Congress neither intended nor envisioned any
further expansion of the coconspirator rule.2 To admit statements made
by coconspirators under a new and different rule would, therefore, be
contrary to the legislative intent.
The coconspirator rule is not perfect. However, allowing another
avenue for the admission of inculpatory coconspirator statements would
merely add more confusion. Because all kinds of circumstances could be
considered for corroboration under the declaration against penal in-
terest exception," the admission of coconspirator statements would
become much less predictable. 5 This would effectively be treating hear-
say individually. Individual analysis involves more judicial discretion98
and would facilitate the development of numerous definitions of what is
reliable.
The court in United States v. Alvarez97 was concerned with the
reliability of inculpatory declarations against penal interest because the
" Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 8-01(c)(3){v), Advisory Committee Note (1969
draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 341 (1969).
See notes 38-41 & accompanying text supra.
" Garland & Snow, supra note 2, at 5; Oakley, supra note 4, at 45; Comment, supra note
23, at 539; Comment, supra note 42, at 623; Note, supra note 38, at 890.
See notes 22-34 & accompanying text supra.
S Garland & Snow, supra note 2, at 5; Oakley, supra note 4, at 45; Comment, supra note
23, at 539; Comment, supra note 42, at 623; Note, supra note 38, at 890.
" See United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978) (some factors to consider in-
clude: veracity of in court witness, reliability of out of court declarant, motive to misrepre-
sent, general character of speaker, whether others heard statement, timing of declaration
and relationship between speaker and witness); United States v. Guilette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1978) (four general, though not exhaustive, considera-
tions are: time of declaration and to whom it was made, existence of corroborating
evidence, extent to which statement is truly against interest and availability of declarant).
," See Oakley, supra note 4. The Advisory Committee rejected the approach of treating
hearsay statements individually in the setting of a particular case and opted for a system of
class exception. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Art. VIII (1972 draft), 56 F.R.D. 183,
290 (1972).
" See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Art. VIII (1972 draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 290
(1972).584 F.2d 694, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1978).
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confrontation clause of the sixth amendment forbids the introduction of
unreliable evidence in certain circumstances. 8 The Advisory Committee
grappled with the problem of inculpatory declarations against penal in-
terest and the confrontation clause because of its concern that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bruton v. United States" might require the
exclusion of all inculpatory declarations against penal interest. 0° In
Bruton, the Court held that a confession by the codefendant's ac-
complice which inculpated the defendant was inadmissible in a joint
trial when the accomplice refused to testify on fifth amendment
grounds.'0' According to the Court, the admission of the confession
violated the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment because the
defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
against him.' 2
While Congress was considering the implications of Bruton, it ignored
Dutton v. Evans,"' where the Supreme Court examined the relationship
between a coconspirator rule and the confrontation clause. Dutton held
that when a coconspirator's statement is admitted pursuant to a
coconspirator rule, the confrontation clause is not violated if there are
sufficient "indicia of reliability" warranting the statement's admission.' 4
" Id. "[T]he central feature of Confrontation Clause analysis became the 'practical con-
cern' for the reliability of inculpatory hearsay." Id. at 701. One commentator believes that a
literal reading of the confrontation clause would require the state to present all the
evidence against the accused in direct testimony form. Griswold, The Due Process Revolu-
tion and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713-14, 717-18, 728 (1971).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
See Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), Tentative Subcommittee draft of
H.R. 5463 in Proposed Rules of Evidence: Supplement to Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
175 (1973).
101 391 U.S. at 123; see United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 346 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978).
391 U.S. at 126.
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly
not admissible against him under traditional rules of evidence .... the prob-
lem arising only because the statement was . . . admissible against the
declarant Evans.... There is not before us, therefore, any recognized excep-
tion to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no
view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Con-
frontation Clause.
Id. at 128 n.3 (emphasis added). This point was also made in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86
(1970).
'0 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
"' Id. at 87-89. It has been suggested that the "indicia of reliability" test is derived from
the due process clause-not the confrontation clause. See id. at 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring
in the result). Trial by affidavit is the evil at which the confrontation clause is aimed, and it
only applies to criminal prosecutions. See id. at 94-95 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
Therefore, the confrontation clause is not intended as a standard for testing evidence. See
id- at 96 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Evidence should be tested under the fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process clauses. See id. at 96-97 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result); Westen, supra note 72, at 601.
The courts of appeals are split on whether the coconspirator rule satisfies the reliability
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The standards for what constitute "indicia of reliability" were not
clearly set out in Dutton.' Some courts focus only on the aspect of Dut-
ton which requires that the statement be admitted pursuant to a hear-
say exception, and conclude that whenever this occurs there is no con-
frontation problem."8 These courts either do not concern themselves
with reliability, 7 or hold that the statement is per se reliable if it meets
an exception to the hearsay rule."8 Other courts of appeals read Dutton
as requiring a case-by-case determination to see if the statement is
reliable after the requirements of the coconspirator rule are met.0 9 The
Supreme Court, however, recently stated: "Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception."" Therefore, if Dutton is read in conjunction with
this recent case, the better interpretation is that the statements are
reliable if the coconspirator rule requirements are met.
Although the coconspirator rule has Supreme Court confrontation
requirements of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In Dutton, the statement was both
spontaneous and against the declarant's penal interest. Id. at 89. The Court's analysis of the
reliability criterion in Dutton is unconvincing, and the fact that a portion of the statement
was against penal interest does not establish trustworthiness. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-111.
101 See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG. supra note 54, at 546. In Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972), the Court reiterated the Dutton language: "The focus of the Court's concern has
been to insure that there are 'indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as deter-
minative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confron-
tation of the declarant,"' id. at 213 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)), "and to
'afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,'
408 U.S. at 213 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
907 (1979); United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1977); Ottomano v. United States,
468 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973). Some writers have inter-
preted the case in a similar manner. See Note, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 198, 198 (1978); Comment,
supra note 42, at 628.
I' See United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1362 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 907 (1979); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1128 (1973).
10' United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917
(1979); United States v. Davis, 578 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kelley, 526
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d
730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). Under the existing procedure in some
federal courts, a coconspirator statement is admitted and the jury is instructed to ignore
the statement unless the prosecutor establishes the preliminary facts by independent
evidence. Note, Co-Conspirator Declarations: Constitutional Defects in the Admissions
Procedure, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 63, 86 (1976). It has been suggested that the judge's
preliminary determination should ensure the reliability of coconspirator statements. Id. at
85.
110 Ohio v. Roberts, 48 U.S.L.W. 4874, 4877 (June 25, 1980). The Court did not cite prior
decisions for this exact statement, and there is a conflict between this statement and the
statement in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970): "[W]e have more than once
found a violation of confrontation values even 'though the statements in issue were admit-
ted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception."
1980]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
clause approval, the same cannot be said for the declaration against
penal interest exception. The declaration against penal interest excep-
tion is not "a firmly rooted" hearsay exception,'' and reliability cannot
therefore be inferred on this basis. Furthermore, a coconspirator's
statements that inculpate a fellow coconspirator are rarely against in-
terest "2 and reliability cannot be established on the basis of the against
interest rationale. Consequently, admitting a coconspirator's in-
culpatory declaration against penal interest could be a violation of the
confrontation clause. This possible violation of the confrontation clause
together with Congress' decision to require pendency, furtherance and
independent evidence for the admission of coconspirator statements"'
suggests that inculpatory coconspirator statements should not be admit-
ted under the declaration against penal interest exception.
COLLATERAL STATEMENTS - A RESOLUTION
The apparent overlap which some courts have perceived between
FRE 801(d)(2)(E) and FRE 804(b)(3) can be avoided if it is recognized that
the portions of a statement which implicate another are almost never
against the declarant's interest,"' and if only those declarations or por-
tions thereof that are truly against the declarant's interest are admit-
ted. Some courts have incorrectly maintained that almost any statement
a declarant coconspirator could make to incriminate the accused would
tend to implicate the declarant himself because it tends to show he had
insider's knowledge"' and implies his personal participation in criminal
activity."8 The implication of personal participaton, however, does not
make the naming of the other party a statement against the declarant's
interest."' Invoking another's name might be gratuitous, or said in the
interest of avoiding responsibility and shifting the blame, or exag-
gerating to impress a listener.18 It will almost never be against the
declarant's own interest to name another as a compatriot." 9 The ra-
tionale of the declaration against penal interest exception is that an in-
dividual is unlikely to make a statement adverse to his criminal interest
See note 120 infra.
,, See notes 117-25 & accompanying text infra.
' See note 33 supra.
... Davenport, supra note 27, at 1396.
' United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 1976).
,, United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1st Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, since coconspirators are liable for
the crimes of fellow coconspirators, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. supra note 52, § 65, at 515
(1972); see United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1977), statements inculpating a
fellow coconspirator in a crime would implicate the declarant in the crime.
" Davenport, supra note 27, at 1396.
... Jefferson, supra note 47, at 62.
"I Id. at 59; see State v. Darby, 123 Ariz. 368, 371, 599 P.2d 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1979).
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unless it is true.20 This rationale is not applicable to the portion of the
statement that inculpates the accused12' because it is not truly against
the declarant's interest. If X tells his acquaintance, Y, that Z offered X
$2000 to burn down a hotel, and that X agreed and did burn down the
hotel, it is against X's penal interest to admit to burning down the hotel,
but it is not against his interest to say that someone else was involved.
The portion inculpating Z is merely collateral to the "against interest"
portion of the statement, unless X knows his inculpating Z could subject
him to penal liability for conspiracy," or that he is liable for the acts of
fellow coconspirators.'1 If, when making the statement, X did realize
that he was implicating himself not only in the crime of arson but also in
the separate crime of conspiracy, it would still not be against his in-
terest to admit that the other party was Z, as opposed to A or B. The
problem becomes more severe when one recognizes that the declarant
does not have to directly implicate himself, 24 he merely has to make a
statement that tends to implicate himself. Without X's knowledge that
his statement was against his interest there is no safeguard that the
statement is reliable."
'" 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-90; Morgan, supra
note 54, at 456-57. This reasoning was rejected by the English courts in the famous Sussex
Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844). The Sussex Peerage Case first
announced what became the traditional view on the admissibility of declarations against
penal interest. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 278; Note, Declarations Against Penal In-
terest. What Must Be Corroborated Under the Newly Enacted Federal Rule of Evidence,
Rule 804b)(8), 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (1975). Ignoring the prior precedent of Clymer v.
Littler, 97 Eng. Rep. 812 (K.B. 1761), the court in Sussex Peerage decided that a statement
against the declarant's penal interest was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Jefferson, supra note 47, at 40; Morgan, supra note 54, at 463; see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, § 278; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1476. The Sussex Peerage Case was
followed without question in the United States. Fine, supra note 102, at 1097; Jefferson,
supra note 47, at 40; Note, 79 DICK. L. REV. 189, 192 (1974). Both state, see, e.g., Halvorsen
v. Moon 7 Kerr Lumber Co., 87 Minn. 18, 91 N.W. 28 (1902); In re Wininegar, 337 P.2d 445
(Okla. Crim. 1959); Breeden v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 1975), and
federal courts, see, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); United States v.
Harris, 501 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), followed the Sussex Peerage Case, especially in criminal
cases. See Jefferson, supra note 47, at 40. The first famous challenge to this doctrine was
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277
(1913). The modern trend is to follow Holmes' dissent and include statements against penal
interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-302
(1973); see Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest Standards of Admissibility Under an
Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. REV. 148, 179 (1976); Note, 43 TENN. L. REV. 374, 376
(1976). The Federal Rules of Evidence follow the modern trend. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
1, 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-111; Comment, supra
note 23, at 540; Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1965).
11 Levie, supra note 23, at 1165. A conspirator's statement is good to show that the con-
spiracy exists, but not to show the aims and membership of the conspiracy. Id.
1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT. supra note 52, § 64, at 502.
12 See United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1978).
in Jefferson, supra note 47, at 17.
Even in those very rare cases where invoking the name of the accused is truly against
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Since the portion of the statement which inculpates a fellow cocon-
spirator is, at best, collateral to the portion of the declaration that is
truly against interest, the collateral statement should not be admissi-
ble."0 The text of FRE 804(b)(3) does not discuss whether collateral
statements are admissible, and commentators and courts disagree about
their admissibility." Both Wigmore and Morgan maintain that hearsay
declarations incriminating defendants as well as declarants should be
admissible. They reason that the declaration against interest shows
the declarant's trustworthy state of mind, and, therefore, the entire
statement should be admissible. This theory presumes that a trustwor-
thy state of mind carries over to statements that are not against in-
terest." However, the basis of the declaration against penal interest ex-
ception is not that the declarant is in a trustworthy state of mind,3 0 but
that an individual is unlikely to make a statement adverse to his penal
interest unless it is true."3 ' Therefore, once the declarant has begun the
collateral portion of the statement, the probability of trustworthiness
becomes highly speculative."' The collateral portion of the statement
would seem to be equally unreliable whether or not accompanied by a
declaration against interest. Consequently, only those declarations or
portions of declarations that are truly against interest should be admit-
ted.
the coconspirator declarant's interest, the declaration against penal interest exception
should not be applied. These statements still should be required to meet the foundation of
the coconspirator rule.
Congress enacted a strict rule for coconspirator statements. See note 33 & accompanying
text supra. Although the Advisory Committee seemingly allowed the courts to legislate by
providing that the courts could determine the circumstances under which inculpatory
declarations against penal interest were admissible, see note 20 supra, the courts should
not be allowed to supersede congressional intent concerning the coconspirator rule in apply-
ing the new declaration against penal interest exception. This congr ssional intent, when
considered together with the confusion that would result from having tf les, see notes
91-93 & accompanying text supra, the necessity of giving every provision of aTegislative
enactment significance, see notes 56-57 & accompanying text supra, and the undesirability
of applying the same corroboration standard for inculpatory and exculpatory declarations
against penal interest, suggests that the higher burden imposed by Congress under the co-
conspirator rule must be met even by those inculpatory coconspirator statements that argu-
ably do fall under both rules.
"' FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); see Comment, supra note 74, at 1201.
See notes 130-46 & accompanying text infra. "Under the common law exception for
declarations against interest, the treatment to be given portions of a declaration collateral
to the declarant's interest has been the subject of much debate." United States v. Barrett,
539 F.2d 244, 252 (1st Cir. 1976).
'2, 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1465 ("IT]he statement may be accepted, not merely as
to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the statement.").
' Jefferson, supra note 47, at 62.
s Id- at 60; see State v. Darby, 123 Ariz. 368, 371, 599 P.2d 821, 824 (Ct. App. 1979).
,' Jefferson, supra note 47, at 60; see notes 121-22 & accompanying text supra.
' Jefferson, supra note 47, at 60.
Id. at 62.
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A second method for dealing with the admissibility of collateral
statements is to admit the entire declaration if the "against interest"
element predominates over the collateral part.'TM This position is taken.
by many courts if there is a single inseparable statement that is both
self-serving, or neutral, and against interest."5 If the against interest
portion is equalized by the self-serving or neutral component, the state-
ment is excluded. 8 However, this can be faulted on the same basis as
Wigmore's approach."7 Since the reliability theory for the declaration
against penal interest exception is not based on any sustained frame of
mind,"' it is no more probable that the collateral portion, which is either
self-serving or neutral, is reliable when accompanied by an "against in-
terest" portion, than when the "against interest" portion is not
present.3 9 This approach allows remarks that are not against interest to
be admitted under the declaration against penal interest exception, and
it does not guarantee that only reliable statements will be admitted.
This is especially harmful when the portion that is not against interest
inculpates the accused. Therefore, the conclusion, again, is that only the
truly against interest statements should be admitted.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, all unreliable statements should be withheld from the trier of
fact, 4' especially when those unreliable statements are offered against
an accused. The tolerable margin for error in presenting unreliable
statements is even smaller when a coconspirator's declaration is used
against an accused than when it is used in his favor."' Consequently,
while it may be acceptable to admit a coconspirator's exculpatory
declaration even though the portion referring to the accused is not truly
against the declarant's penal interest, only the portion of a coconspira-
tor's statement which is truly against the declarant's interest should be
admitted where the statement inculpates the defendant.' This is neces-
13 R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 54, at 466.
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
" Jefferson, supra note 47, at 50.
137 Id.
18Id.
SId- at 60.
xW See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
. See notes 68-86 & accompanying text supra.
1 E.g., United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976).
3 This is Jefferson's approach. See Jefferson, supra note 47, at 50. McCormick also ad-
vocates this approach. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 279. United States v. Liiley, 581 F.2d
182 (8th Cir. 1978), adheres to the position that the portions of the statements inculpating
the accused should be excluded. The California Supreme Court has utilized Jefferson's ap-
proach in interpreting CAL. EvID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966) on declarations against penal
interest. See People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975); CAL.
EviD. CODE § 1230 (West 1966) is very similar to FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3). Proposed Federal,
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sary in order to avoid dilution of the coconspirator rule requirements
through the use of the declaration against penal interest exception, and
to avoid the confrontation clause problems presented by a coconspira-
tor's inculpatory declarations.
Since the portion of the statement implicating the accused will only
be admitted under the coconspirator rule, there is no confrontation
clause problem.1 " The overlap between the coconspirator rule and the
declaration against penal interest exception for inculpatory statements
would be avoided because only the truly "against interest" portion of
the declarant coconspirator's statement which would not implicate the
accused could be admitted as a declaration against penal interest. If the
jury could reasonably infer the deleted portion, even the "against in-
terest" portion would not be admissible.145 The entire statement could
be admitted only if the additional requirements of the coconspirator rule
are met.
The higher standard imposed by Congress for coconspirator
statements under the coconspirator rule should be met even in those
very rare situations when inculpating a fellow coconspirator is against
the declarant coconspirator's interest. This avoids the confusion that
would result from having two rules, gives every provision of a legisla-
tive enactment significance and follows congressional intent.
Although one court has held that the rules can be reconciled by re-
quiring corroborating circumstances for inculpatory declarations against
penal interest, just as are required for exculpatory declarations,"' this
is unacceptable. Not only are different constitutional considerations ap-
plicable to inculpatory and exculpatory statements, but also, the level of
protection afforded a defendant varies when the same standard is ap-
plied to both. Furthermore, admitting coconspirators' inculpatory
declarations against interest under the declaration against penal in-
terest exception wherever corroborating circumstances are present con-
travenes the congressional intent to limit the admission of coconspira-
tors' statements. These problems are alleviated if inculpatory cocon-
Rules of Evidence (1972 draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 328 (1972). The California Supreme Court did
not directly deal with the conflict between the coconspirator rule and the declaration
against penal interest exception since they found the evidence in question was inadmissible
under either rule.
1.. The Supreme Court has upheld a coconspirator rule against confrontation clause
challenges. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); text accompanying notes 104-10 supra.
See People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 541 P.2d 296, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1975). It might
seem that the defendant would try to introduce that portion of his coconspirator's state-
ment that says that the declarant robbed the bank, thereby implying that the defendant
was not involved. However, this could be treated as an adoptive admission, see FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(2)(B), or as an exculpatory declaration, and by offering the declarant coconspira-
tor's statement into evidence the defendant may waive his objection to the total statement.
"' United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978).
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spirator statements are inadmissible under the declaration against
penal interest exception. If a prosecutor wants an inculpatory cocon-
spirator's statement admitted, the statement should have to meet the
requirements of the coconspirator rule.
DIANE M. FRYE

